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Abstract. Percolation based graph matching algorithms rely on the 
availability of seed vertex pairs as side information to e ciently match 
users across networks. Although such algorithms work well in practice, 
there are other types of side information available which are potentially 
useful to an attacker. In this paper, we consider the problem of matching 
two correlated graphs when an attacker has access to side information, 
either in the form of community labels or an imperfect initial matching. In 
the former case, we propose a naive graph matching algorithm by in-
troducing the community degree vectors which harness the information 
from community labels in an e cient manner. Furthermore, we analyze a 
variant of the basic percolation algorithm proposed in [44] for graphs with 
community structure. In the latter case, we propose a novel percolation 
algorithm with two thresholds which uses an imperfect matching as input 
to match correlated graphs. 
 
We evaluate the proposed algorithms on synthetic as well as real world 
datasets using various experiments. The experimental results demon-
strate the importance of communities as side information especially when 
the number of seeds is small and the networks are weakly correlated. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Graph matching algorithms have become a focus of research among various 
communities recently [20, 21, 22, 31, 45, 25]. Given two graphs, G1 and G2, 
with correlated vertex and edge sets, a graph matching algorithm tries to nd a 
mapping between the vertex sets of G1 and G2. Graph matching algorithms nd 
relevance in different domains. An example, which is the focus of this work, is 
the study of privacy risks involved in sharing data of social network users [11, 
2, 41]. Each user in a social network can be represented as a vertex, and an 
interaction (friendship, message etc.) between two users is indicated by an 
edge. The shared data helps data mining researchers in understanding 
network related properties [39, 40, 37, 3, 32, 42, 26] as well as organizations 
to generate revenues using product advertisements and recommendations 
[15, 46, 28]. Although of great utility, this data has the potential to leak user 
privacy [24, 29] and this privacy-utility trade-off has been noted in the 
literature [7, 27]. Another example is the 
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alignment of protein-protein interaction (PPI) networks, which is an important 
step in understanding the biological processes involved in cell interactions 
[38]. In this case, vertices of a graph represent proteins and a direct physical 
interaction between two proteins is represented by an edge.  
The two networks, G1 and G2, may represent two different social networks, 
for example Facebook and Google+, or may even be the snapshots of the 
same network at two different times. The target network, G2, often contains 
private information about network users, while real identities may be known in 
the auxiliary network, G1 [19]. Thus, a correct mapping between the vertex 
sets of the two graphs results in associating private information in G2 to real 
world individuals, which is a breach of user privacy. Such an identi cation of 
individuals in a network is termed network deanonymization.  
Previous studies, for the most part, focused on availability of the, so called, 
seed vertex pairs to match correlated graphs. For example, Narayanan and 
Shmatikov [31] successfully matched a fraction of users in two real world net-
works using a heuristic algorithm. Nilizadeh et al. [34] incorporated the 
commu-nity level information to improve upon this work. Although Nilizadeh et 
al. use the community structure of the networks, our work di ers from their's in 
several ways. We analyze the importance of community structure in the graph 
matching problem when the seeds are not available to an attacker. For this 
purpose, we propose an algorithm which uses the information from the 
community structure by utilizing the community level degrees of the vertices, 
rather than the global degrees. Also, the structure of the percolation 
algorithms, proposed in this paper, is different than the algorithm in [34]. We 
would like to emphasize that the results in this paper, in fact, complement the 
results in [34] by providing a theoretical understanding of the importance of 
the community structure in graph matching problem. Wondracek et al. [43], 
solving a slightly different problem, utilized the group membership information 
to identify users in a network. Some studies also approached this problem 
from a theoretical viewpoint. For example, Yartseva and Grossglauser [44] 
proposed and analyzed a graph matching algo-rithm based on bootstrap 
percolation. Chiasserini et al. [8] studied the Effect of clustering on network 
deanonymization and showed empirically that clustering can potentially 
decrease the initial seed set size required to percolate in random geometric 
graphs. 
 
Contributions. All the aforementioned work on network deanonymization fo-
cused only on one type of side information, i.e., seeds. This motivated us to 
ask the following question: If an attacker has access to other side information, 
including seeds, how could it be used e ciently in network deanonymization? 
The main aim of this paper is to investigate the role played by the side 
information in the graph matching problem. We will consider three types of 
side information in this paper: seeds, community structure, and an imperfect 
matching of the graphs G1 and G2. We would like to emphasize that the 
source of these side information is not the concern of this work, though it 
would be an interesting research direction. 
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To analyze the problem theoretically, we consider two correlated graphs, 
G1 and G2, generated using the Stochastic Block Model (SBM) [17]. The 
contribution of this work is twofold. First, we propose and analyze a naive 
algorithm which uses community degree vectors of the network users to 
deanonymize them. Assuming that the number of communities grows slowly 
with network size, we derive conditions on model parameters such that it is 
possible to match the graphs perfectly using this algorithm. We also propose 
and analyze a variant of simple percolation algorithm [44] for graphs with 
community structure. We show that the matching threshold [44] r = 2 is su 
cient to match almost all users correctly when the number of communities 
grows faster that the square of the logarithm of the number of vertices. 
Second, we propose a two-threshold percolation algorithm which uses an 
imperfect matching as an input. The imperfect matching is used to identify 
pairs of users which have high probability of being correct pairs. These 
special pairs are assigned a lower threshold for the percolation step, while the 
rest of the pairs are assigned a higher threshold. The use of different 
thresholds for different kinds of pairs is useful in two ways. When the correct 
pairs are more probable to get a lower threshold, the number of seeds 
required to percolate decreases. Also, as the percolation algorithms tend to 
make more errors in the beginning, mapping the correct pairs early reduces 
the overall error of the algorithm. Assuming that the algorithm percolates, we 
derive conditions under which the algorithm does not make an error with high 
probability. 
 
We conduct experiments on synthetic as well as real world networks by 
varying the number of seeds, levels of correlation, and fraction of community 
labels known to the attacker. Based on our results, we nd that availability of 
side information in the form of community labels is very useful when (i) the 
number of seeds is small, and (ii) the correlation between the datasets is 
weak. We also nd that the availability of community labels for a fraction of 
users is enough for the proposed percolation graph matching algorithm to 
perform better than other similar algorithms.  
In the end, we discuss some implications of our work and experimental 
results for network privacy. We also discuss possible future directions and 
questions that need to be answered in order to design better techniques to 
mitigate the Effects of side information in network deanonymization.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by reviewing the 
relevant literature in Section 2. The system and the attack models are given in 
Section 3. Section 4 describes the proposed algorithms and their theoretical 
analysis. The experimental results are discussed in Section 5. We conclude 
with some remarks and future directions in Section 6. 
 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
The network deanonymization problem has received attention in the recent 
years. The problem has mostly been studied from a practical viewpoint but 
some the- 
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oretical aspects have also been studied. In this section, we discuss some of 
the important literature associated with the problem.  
Narayanan and Shmatikov [31] were among the rst researchers to study the 
network deanonymization problem. They proposed a heuristic algorithm to 
deanonymize users of a network when an adversary has access to a correlated 
auxiliary network. The algorithm rst identi ed some seed vertex pairs and then 
used this information to propagate and map the remaining users. They were suc-
cessful in mapping a fraction of the users of Twitter and Flickr networks with small 
error rate. Nilizadeh et al. [34] extended this method and incorporated the 
community structure of the networks. Utilizing the community structure reduced 
the size of candidate user pairs and helped in identifying more seed ver-tices, 
thereby reducing the error rate. They were able to map correlated large Twitter 
networks with as few as 16 seeds. They also noted that their method only works if 
the correlation between the networks is high. Wondracek et al. [43] consider the 
problem of deanonymizing users when their communities' member-ships are 
known in a network. They also created community ngerprints of users by stealing 
their browser history. They showed, by comparing ngerprints and memberships, 
that some of the users could be identi ed uniquely while the can-didate set is 
greatly reduced for others. Although these works give insight into the problem of 
deanonymization, they lack a theoretical framework and seem to be dataset speci 
c.  
Some e cient deanonymization algorithms have been proposed recently. Ji 
et al. [20] analyzed the graph matching problem for the con guration model. 
They proposed an optimization based deanonymization algorithm to match 
the two graphs, but did not provide theoretical guarantees for the algorithm. 
Yartseva and Grossglauser [44] proposed and analyzed a percolation 
algorithm for match-ing correlated Erd•os-Renyi graphs. The algorithm begins 
by considering a set of seed pairs which spread their marks to other pairs of 
vertices. As soon as a par-ticular pair of vertices reaches a xed threshold, r, it 
is considered as matched. They established a phase transition in the size of 
initial seed set for matching the graphs almost completely. There are two main 
drawbacks to their method. First, the theoretical guarantee is only proved for r 
4, which makes the algorithm impractical as it requires a huge number of 
seeds in that case. Second, the threshold r is same for all vertex pairs. In [22], 
Kazemi et al. proposed a variant of percolation algorithm which requires fewer 
initial seeds but the error increases slightly compared to the former algorithm. 
They also showed that r = 2 suffices to match most of the vertex pairs with 
only o(n) pairs matched incorrectly. To overcome the shortcomings of [44, 22], 
we propose a two-threshold percolation graph matching algorithm. As will be 
seen later, the proposed algorithm not only percolates with fewer seeds but 
also achieves lower error rates compared to the algorithms in [44, 22].  
Recently, some information theoretic results were derived for matching corre-
lated graphs drawn from random models. Pedarsani and Grossglauser [36] ana-
lyzed the graph matching problem theoretically for Erd•os-Renyi random graphs 
and derived an achievability result for matching two correlated graphs perfectly. 
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They established that the average degree has to grow slightly faster than the 
logarithm of the size of the graphs in order to achieve perfect 
deanonymization. Cullina and Kiyavash [9] improved upon their result for 
achievability and also derived an almost tight converse for the problem. In 
[10], Cullina et al. proved similar achievability and converse results for the 
graphs drawn from the Stochastic Block Model. They also derived conditions 
on model parameters which enable perfect community recovery while 
preventing perfect de-anonymization simultaneously. Onaran et al. [35] also 
derived an achievability result for this problem when the network is divided 
into two possibly unequally sized communities. Ji et al. [19] considered the 
exact as well as partial deanonymization problem when seed vertex pairs are 
available to the attacker. They derived achievability bounds for Erd•os-Renyi 
random graphs and extended the results to more general graphs. Although 
these information theoretic results provide good insights into the problem, 
they do not provide e cient algorithms to deanonymize networks. 
 
Fabiana et al. [13] proposed a deanonymization algorithm for matching 
graphs with power law degree distribution. They used degree distribution to 
divide the user pairs into categories. Based on their degrees, the matching 
thresh-olds are assigned to these pairs. The algorithm rst uses higher 
threshold to match moderately higher degree users, then progressively 
reduces the threshold to match low degree users, and in the end matches 
users with very high degrees. Although they use different thresholds for 
different pairs, the minimum thresh-old used is rmin = 3, and as seen in their 
experiments, the algorithm requires many seeds to percolate when the scale-
free graphs are moderately correlated. In contrast, our algorithm requires far 
fewer seeds to percolate even when the correlation between the datasets is 
weak. 
 
 
3 The Graph Matching Problem 
 
This section introduces, in detail, the graph matching problem that the paper 
aims to solve. First, representation of social networks as graphs is discussed 
followed by the description of the Stochastic Block Model (SBM) for random 
graphs. Next, the process of generating correlated graphs is explained along 
with the attack model. 
 
3.1 Social Networks as Graphs 
 
As noted in previous literature [31, 34, 36, 23], a social network can be 
modeled as a graph (directed or undirected). In this paper, the vertex and the 
edge sets of a graph G are denoted by V(G) and E(G) respectively. The users 
of a social network are represented as vertices in a graph whereas the 
existence of a relation (e.g. friendship link, messages etc.) between two users 
is modeled by an edge between them. For the purpose of this paper, social 
networks are modeled as undirected graphs (directed graphs contain more 
information and are easier to deanonymize [19]). 
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3.2 Stochastic Block Model 
 
Communities are an integral part of any social network [14, 30]. Community 
detection in networks [16, 1, 14] is one of the most widely studied problem in 
social network analysis. The Stochastic Block Model (SBM) is a random graph 
model used to generate graphs with community structure [17].  
Consider an n vertex graph, G, with vertex set V (G) and edge set E(G). Also, 
let there be a community label assignment function C: V (G) {1, 2,,,,,, K}  [K], 
where K is the number of communities in G. This function associates a community 
label with every vertex in G and hence partitions V (G) into disjoint sets called 
communities. Let Ck  {v ϵ V (G): C(v) = k} denote the vertex set of the k
th
 
community. We assume that communities are equally sized
1
, i.e., |Ci| = |Cj| for i, j 
ϵ [K]. Let P(X) denote the probability of an event X. The edge set, E(G), is 
generated as follows. For vertices u, v ϵ V (G), we have 
 
 
 
where p, q ϵ (0, 1) and are allowed to depend on n. Note that, p and q denote 
the probability that an edge exists between vertices belonging to the same 
com-munity and different communities, respectively. In this model, the 
existence of an edge is independent of the existence of any other edge. We 
assume that p q for the rest of this work as the communities are assortative in 
real networks. The graph distribution associated with this generative method 
is denoted by SBM (n, p, q, K). When p = q or K = 1, this model degenerates 
to the Erd•os-Renyi random graph model [12].  
Although the Stochastic Block Model is not completely representative of 
the community structure found in real world networks, it is used often in the 
theoretical analysis for problems involving communities in graphs. The main 
reasons for this choice are as follows. First, it captures the assortativity 
property exhibited by the real networks. Second, the theoretical analysis of 
the problem becomes tractable, and also results in providing an intuitive 
explanation of the problem for real networks. 
 
3.3 Problem Formulation 
 
Generating Correlated Graphs We use the following model to generate 
correlated graphs. Consider an underlying graph G with vertex set V (G) = {1, 
2,,,,,,,,n}  [n] and G~SBM (n, p, q, K). First, generate graph G1 with V (G1) 
= V (G). The edge set, E(G1), is then generated as follows. For every edge e 
2 E(G), P (e ϵ E(G1)) = s, where s ϵ (0,1) is called the sampling parameter, 
and P (e ϵ E(G1)) = 0 if e E(G). The sampling of every edge  
1 Our results can be extended to the case with unequal communities but with consid-erably 
increased mathematical complexity. The assumption of equally sized commu-nities simpli es 
the proofs and enables us to focus on the main qualitative results.
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Fig. 1: A toy example for generating two correlated graphs. 
 
is independent of other edges. The graph G2 is generated independently and 
identically. Figure 1 depicts a toy example of this generating process. Note 
that this is the same model which was used in previous studies [19, 21, 22]. 
We further assume that the vertices of G2 are anonymized using naive 
anonymization in which any personal identi ers are replaced by random identi 
ers. Although it is a simple anonymization technique, naive anonymization is 
still the most widely used method to anonymize datasets before publishing 
[31, 41]. Hence, we index the vertices of G2 by {1’, 2’,….., n’}  [n’]. Without 
loss of generality, we assume that i ϵ V (G1) and i’ ϵ V (G2) correspond to the 
same vertex in G. This notation proves bene cial for the analysis later. It is 
useful to note that G1, G2 ~ SBM (n, ps, qs, K). Let the vertex set of the Kth 
community in G1 and G2 be denoted by 𝐶𝑘
1
  and 𝐶𝑘
2
  respectively. More 
formally, for z ϵ {1,2}, 𝐶𝑘
𝑧
 = {v ϵ V(G2) , C(v) =k}. To ensure connectivity [12] in 
the graphs G1 and G2 we consider graphs with logarithmic average degree, 
i.e., p=a
log 𝑛
𝑛
 and q= b
log 𝑛 
𝑛
 , where a; b are constants which are called model 
parameters. This choice of average degree also captures the sparse nature of 
connectivity found in the real world networks. Also, we assume that the 
number of communities is K = nα (unless otherwise stated), 𝛼ϵ (0, 1), which 
means that the number of communities grows with number of vertices 
sublinearly. 
 
Modeling the Attacker An attacker is any entity that aims to match the 
vertices of G1 to those of G2, which in turn breaches the privacy of the users 
in a social network. More formally, the goal of an attacker is to construct a 
bijective mapping 𝜋: V (G1)  V (G2) such that 𝜋 = 𝜋0 where 𝜋0(i) = i
’ for 
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all i ϵ V (G1). We call 𝜋0 the ground truth mapping. For the graph G1, let 
𝜋(E(G1))  { 𝜋(u) 𝜋(v) , u, v ϵ V (G1), uv ϵ E(G1)}. Also, let 𝜋 -1 , V (G2)  V 
(G1) denote the inverse of mapping 𝜋.  
We consider an attacker with one or more of the following three possible 
side informations. 
 
-Set of seed vertices, S0, defined as 
 
S0 = {(i; i
’) : i ϵ V(G1), i
’ ϵ V(G2)} (1)  
where |S0| = Ф. This set provides an attacker with vertex pairs which are 
already matched in the two graphs.  
- Community labels of all vertices in both graphs. For a vertex i ϵ V(G1), this 
information restricts the set of candidate vertices to 𝐶𝐶(𝑖)
2 . In Section 5, we 
show that even partial information about the community labels is helpful in  
graph matching. 
- An imperfect matching of the graphs, in which, each vertex i ϵ V(G1) is 
assigned a vertex j’ ϵ V(G2). The pair (i, j
’) is said to be matched by this 
imperfect matching. The term imperfect is used to emphasize the fact that 
the attacker does not know which of the pairs are correctly matched. 
 
Remark 1. We will only consider mappings which preserve the community 
structure when we assume that an attacker knows the community labels of 
the users. The reason is that any rational attacker would use this information 
to limit the search space for the matching. 
 
 
4 Graph Matching Algorithms with Side Information 
 
This section discusses the main contributions of the paper. We discuss three 
graph matching algorithms. The first, called naive algorithm, leverages the 
community label information and does not require seeds to match users 
across two correlated graphs. This is different than most of the algorithms 
proposed in the literature, which depend on seeds to match users further. We 
derive an achievability bound for this algorithm, and thus identify the 
parameter space where the algorithm matches the graphs perfectly with high 
probability. The second al-gorithm is an extension of the basic percolation 
algorithm in [44] to graphs with community structure. We show that when the 
community labels are known, the graph matching task becomes much easier 
and the error-free matching threshold can be as small as r = 2 when the 
number of communities is K = ὠ(log2 n). The third algorithm assumes that an 
imperfect matching of the users is given as input and uses this information 
along with a modi ed graph matching per-colation algorithm with two 
thresholds. We derive conditions under which the imperfect information helps 
the percolation algorithm to match users in the two graphs without making 
errors. 
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4.1 The Naive Algorithm 
 
Consider two correlated SBM graphs, G1 and G2, generated as in Section 3.3. 
For some k0 ϵ [K], consider a vertex i ϵ 𝐶𝑘0
1 . For each k ϵ [K], let di(k) = 
|{j ϵ Ck1 : ij ϵ E(G1)}| be the size of the neighborhood of i in community k. 
Similarly, for a vertex j’ ϵ 𝐶𝑘0
2  define dj’(k). Then the community degree vector 
of i, denoted by di, is defined as 
 
di = [di(1),………..,di(k0 -1), di(k0 + 1),………,di(K)]
T
 (2)  
Similarly, let dj0 denote the community degree vector of j
0. The community 
degree vectors represent the pattern in which a user connects to various com-
munities in the network. If the number of communities is big enough, there is a 
nontrivial amount of information in these vectors which can be utilized to 
deanonymize the network. In particular, when the graphs are sparse, users 
are connected to only a few communities, which results in enough information 
to deanonymize the users in the network. Intuitively, we expect di to be closer 
to di’ than dj’ for j
’ ≠ I’. We de ne the distance between the pair (i, j’) as 
   
This distance measures the dissimilarity of the community degree vectors of 
the vertices i and j’. If both i and j’ have the same number of neighbors in a 
particular community, the contribution of this community to the distance in (3) 
is 0. In all other cases, the contribution is 1.  
We now propose a naive algorithm to match the graphs G1 and G2. This 
algorithm works as follows. For every vertex i ϵ V (G1), the algorithm returns j’i 
ϵ V (G2) such that i and j’i have the same community label and j’i is closest to i 
in terms of the distance defined in (3), that is, . The 
pseudo code is described in Algorithm 1. This algorithm is conceptually simple 
and computationally efficient as most of the steps in the algorithm could be 
performed in parallel. 
 
The rest of this section is aimed at deriving conditions under which the 
naive algorithm matches the graphs G1 and G2 perfectly with high probability. 
An important observation is that the individual terms in (3) are independent 
because they correspond to edges to different communities. Also, they are 
identically distributed. We are interested in the conditions on the model 
parameters such that P ( 𝛥ii’≥ 𝛥ij’)  0 as  n  ∞ for all i and j’. This means 
that all correct pairs of vertices are closer to each other, in terms of distance 
in (3), compared to incorrect pairs, asymptotically with high probability.  
First, we bound the probability that an arbitrary incorrect pair of vertices 
are closer to each other than the correct pair in terms of distance in (3). 
 
Lemma 1
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Note that ?̃?(k)’s are independent and identically distributed. Let pi = P ( ?̃?(k) = i), i 
ϵ { -1,0, 1}. Let E(Z) denote the expected value of the random variable Z. For any 
x > 0, 
               (6) 
 
where (a) follows from the Markov's inequality, (b) holds because y ey 
1
 for 
any y, and (c) follows after substituting the optimal value of x.  
Now we need to calculate p1 and p 1. Also, let Di(k) denote the number of 
neighbors of vertex i in community k in the underlying graph G from which G1 
and G2 were edge sampled. Then, 
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where (a) follows from the law of total probability. To prove (b), we use the 
following chain of equations. First, using (
𝑛 ∕ 𝐾
𝑚𝑖
) < (
𝑛
𝐾
)
𝑚𝑖
 , we have 
 
 
Now, (b) follows because any conditional terms can be bounded above by 1. So, 
 
          (7) 
 
Similarly, 
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                   (8) 
So we have 
 
 
 
The following theorem provides su cient conditions to match G1 and G2 
perfectly using only the community degree vectors. 
Theorem 1. If b > 
2−𝛼
2𝑠(1−√1−𝑠2)
, and s>0, then the naïve algorithm matches the 
graphs G1 and G2 perfectly with high probability.  
 
Proof. Let Pe denote the probability that at least one vertex of G1 is matched 
incorrectly. Note that, for every vertex i ϵ V (G1), there are exactly n
1
 can-
didates j’. Using Lemma 1 and union bound over i; j’, we have 
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This result implies that when the inter-community edge probability is high 
enough (recall that q = b 
log
n
n ), the community degree vectors contain 
enough information to deanonymize all the users in the network.  
Note that the right-hand side of the condition in Theorem 1 is a decreasing 
function of s. When the value of s is large enough, the naive algorithm can 
deanonymize even very sparse graphs. On the other hand, when s is small 
(say s < 0.75), it requires denser graphs (large value of b) to deanonymize all 
the users. Even if the algorithm may not deanonymize all the users, a small 
fraction of users may still be deanonymized correctly by the naive algorithm. 
In such situations, the algorithm can be used as a preprocessing step to other 
algorithms such as the one described later in Section 4.2. 
 
4.2 Percolation Algorithms 
 
Percolation based graph matching algorithms have been recently proposed in 
literature [44, 22]. Such algorithms are computationally very e cient while pro-
viding good deanonymization results. In this section, we describe variants of 
the basic percolation algorithm in [44] for matching correlated graphs using 
side in-formation. We rst review the basic percolation algorithm introduced in 
[44], followed by the variant when an attacker has access to the community 
label in-formation. We analyze this algorithm and show that, when K = ὠ(log
2
 
n), the matching threshold r = 2 suffices to match almost all the vertices in the 
graphs correctly. We also propose a two-threshold percolation algorithm 
which uses an imperfect matching as input and utilizes this information to 
match further vertices efficiently. 
 
Basic Percolation Algorithm The basic percolation algorithm [44] begins by 
considering a seed set S0 defined in Equation (1). At every time step, a seed pair  
(u; u’) ϵ V(G1) × V(G2) is selected from this set. For all potential vertex pairs (i; 
j’) ϵ V(G1) × V(G2) such that (i; u) ϵ E(G1) and (j
’; u’) ϵ E(G2), the score of the 
pair (i; j0) at time t, denoted by Mij0(t), is increased by one. When the  
score of a pair reaches a threshold r, it is added to the seed set and all other 
pairs involving i and j’ are removed from further considerations. If the size of 
the initial seed set is large enough, then the algorithm percolates to n -- o(n) 
correct vertex pairs if r ≥ 4. For more details see [44]. 
 
Percolation with Community Label Information Suppose that an attacker 
knows the community labels of the users in graphs G1 and G2. We show that 
when the number of communities, K, is large enough, the basic percolation 
algorithm percolates to 
𝑛
𝐾
– o(
𝑛
𝐾
) correct pairs in each community with high 
probability. We establish this by using a tighter bounding technique than that 
used in [44].  
We consider a variant of the basic percolation algorithm, such that, instead 
of picking a seed at every time step, the algorithm picks one seed from each 
community at every time step. Thus, our algorithm picks K seeds at a time 
step. Our aim is to show that this algorithm does not match wrong pair of 
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vertices with high probability even when r = 2. Hence, we will establish that 
the community label information helps in relaxing the threshold from r = 4 to r 
= 2 and thus the algorithm can percolate with small number of seeds. We also 
provide an upper bound on the critical number of seeds needed by our 
algorithm to percolate. 
 
Theorem 2. Let the percolation threshold be r = 2. When the community 
labels of the users in G1 and G2 are known, the percolation algorithm does 
not make errors with high probability if K = !(log
2
 n). Furthermore, the 
algorithm percolates to
𝑛
𝐾
− 𝑜(
𝑛
𝐾
)vertices in each cluster if                                                      
and K=o(√𝑛). 
 
Proof. Let k ϵ [K]. Consider a vertex pair(i’,j’) ϵ 𝐶𝑘
1 × 𝐶𝑘
2 and j’ ≠ i’. Let Xij’(t) be 
the event that the pair (i; j’) is matched at time t. We want to bound the 
probability of this event, P (Xij’(t)), conditioned on the fact that before time t 
only correct pairs were matched. Recall that Mij’(t) is the score of pair (i; j’) at 
time t as defined in Section 4.2. We have 
 
 
Here Bin(t; (ps)
2
) denotes the Binomial random variable with t trials and success 
probability (ps)
2
. An important observation here is that, before time step t, the 
algorithm has already used t vertex pairs from every community. Hence, to union 
bound the above probability only  
 n 
-t) vertices remain to be considered at 
 
 K 
 
time t. Now, we union bound the 
above  pr obabilit y as f ollows:  
    
 
                                                        (10) 
 
 
 
 
for some constant C, where (10) follows from simple algebraic manipulations. 
This completes the rst part of the proof. The second part follows in a straight-
forward manner from Lemma 12 and Theorem 1 in [4].  
 
The above theorem implies that the number of communities needs to scale 
just faster than log
2
 n so that our percolation algorithm does not make errors 
with r = 2. Without the community label information, the threshold is r = 4 as 
shown in [44], thus, the community label information is helpful in reducing the 
seeds required to percolate. 
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Two Threshold Percolation Algorithm A drawback of the basic percolation 
algorithm [44] is that with r 4, the algorithm requires many seeds to percolate. 
In fact, the number of seeds required to achieve percolation is an increasing 
function of the threshold value r. As has been noted in the literature [44, 22], 
the percolation algorithm makes errors in the initial steps when there are only 
a few seeds to deanonymize the graphs. Hence, to reduce such errors, we 
propose a two-threshold percolation algorithm which takes as input an 
imperfect matching and builds upon this information to percolate further. 
Assuming that the algorithm percolates, we also derive conditions under 
which the algorithm does not make errors with high probability. 
 
Consider, as before, two correlated SBM graphs G1 and G2, but we do not 
assume that we have access to the community labels of the users. Suppose 
that there exists an algorithm, A, which gives us the following output. For each 
vertex I ϵ V(G1), let ji’ ϵ V (G2) be the vertex matched to i using the algorithm 
A. Let us call this set of matched pairs F defined by F  {(i; j‘) ϵ V (G1) × (G2) 
: A matches i and j’}. Consider two thresholds, rc and rm, with rc rm. For the 
percolation process, starting with a set of seed pairs, S0, the following strategy 
is used. Pick a seed pair from the seed set. For vertex i, the pair (i; j i0) is 
considered as matched as soon as its score, Miji0, reaches rc. For all other 
potential pairs (I, j’), the matching threshold is rm. More compactly, the vertex 
pairs which were matched by algorithm A are given a lower threshold than the 
other potential pairs. If algorithm A made error, we expect the percolation 
algorithm to correct them. Using a lower threshold for the pair (i; ji’) is helpful 
in reducing errors in the initial stages of the percolation process if ji’ = I’. As the 
correct pairs are more probable to accumulate marks earlier than incorrect 
pairs [44], the lower threshold also helps in reducing the required number of 
seeds. Hence, the more correct pairs algorithm A matches, the fewer seeds 
are required to percolate and the lower the error in the second step. Algorithm 
2 describes the pseudo code of the proposed algorithm. 
 
Asymptotic Analysis The similarity of graph matching algorithms to boot-
strap percolation is noted in the literature [44]. The latter, in general, studies 
the spread of infection among vertices in graphs where the infected vertices 
con-tribute to the infection of their neighbors [18]. When the number of 
infected neighbors of a vertex reaches a certain threshold, it gets infected as 
well. The graph matching algorithm can be thought of along similar lines. 
Instead of ver-tices spreading infection, it is the pair of vertices spreading it in 
the intersection graph GՈ  G1 Ո G2 with vertex set V (G1) and edge set 
E(G1) Ո 𝜋0
−1 (E(G2)). To make the two problems isomorphic, one rst needs to 
establish that the percolation algorithm does not make errors whenever it 
percolates. Therefore, we analyze the proposed algorithm and derive 
conditions under which the algorithm does not make errors with high 
probability. In particular, we aim to characterize the performance of algorithm 
A, required to guarantee that no errors are made while percolating. 
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Algorithm 2 Percolation Algorithm with Two Thresholds  
Require: G1; G2; S0; F 
S = S0; P = Ф; M = 0n× n  
while S \ P ≠Ф ; and |S|≠ n do  
Pick a seed pair (u; v) ϵ S \ P 
Add (u; v) to P 
for all (i; j’) ϵ V (G1)×V (G2) such that ui ϵ E(G1) and vj’ ϵ E(G2) do 
Mij’ = Mij’ + 1 
if ((ji
’ = j’ and Mij’ = rc) || (ji
’ ≠ j’ and Mij’ = rm)) and both i; j
’ are 
unmatched then 
S = S U (i; j’)  
Mark i and j’ as matched 
end if  
end for 
end while  
Return S as the set of matched vertices 
 
 
We assume that algorithm A is independent of the percolation step and 
vice versa. The following theorem provides the conditions under which the 
algorithm does not make errors with high probability, assuming that it 
percolates. 
 
Theorem 3. Let rm ≥ 4 and rc 1. Consider any i 2 V (G1) and j
’ ϵ V (G2) such 
that j’ ≠ i’. For any (i, j’) ϵ V (G1) × (G2), let pf = P ((i; j
’) ϵ F).  
If pf = o(n
rc 
-3
(log n) 
-2rc ), then Algorithm 2 does not match wrong pairs with 
high probability. 
 
Proof. Consider a vertex pair (i; j’) ϵ V (G1) × (G2) and j
’ ≠ i’. Let Xij’(t) be the 
event that the pair (i, j’) is matched at time t. We want to bound the probability 
of this event, P (Xij’(t)), conditioned on the fact that before time t only correct 
pairs were matched. De ne a random variable fij’ as 
  
Now, we can bound the above probability as 
                   (11) 
 
 
where E1 is the event [fij’ = 1; Mij’(t) = rc; Mii’(t) ≤ rm; Mjj’(t) ≤ rm] and E2 is the 
event [fij’ = 0; Mij’(t) = rm, Mii’(t)≤ rm, Mjj’(t)≤ rm].  
Till time t, let T1, and T2 be the random variables corresponding to the number 
of seeds with community labels C(i) and C(j
’
) respectively. Consider that 
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C(i) ≠ C(j’). The other case, when C(i) = C(j’), follows similarly by substituting 
T2 = 0 and replacing pq by p
2
 in the equations below. We have 
                               (12) 
X  
X  
X  
X X  
where (a) is true because the probability of the intersection of multiple events 
is smaller than the probability of individual events, (b) follows from the law of 
total probability, (c) follows from q < p and because n(qs)
2
  0, and (d) 
follows from t ≤ n. If rm ≥ 4, then 
 
 
(13) 
 
  
 
 
For event E1, we have  
 
 
 
 
 
Using union bound and the condition in the theorem, we have  
 
 
 (14)  
 
  
When the community label information is available, the naive algorithm 
pro-posed earlier can be used as a preprocessing algorithm before 
percolation. In the next section, we show experimentally that Algorithm 2, with 
rc = 1 and rm = 2, performs much better than similar graph matching 
algorithms. This in turn shows that the community labels serve as excellent 
side information, helping both in reducing the number of seeds needed to 
percolate and achieving lower error rates. 
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5 Experimental Evaluation 
 
In this section, we evaluate the proposed algorithms on synthetic as well as 
real world datasets. The main goal of this section is to show that information 
about community labels, if used properly, enhances the deanonymization 
results especially when the correlation between the networks is low.  
In the experiments below, we compare the following algorithms:  
- A1: percolation with rc = rm = 1  
- A2: percolation with rc = 1, rm = 2 (our proposed algorithm)  
- A3: percolation with rc = rm = 2  
- A4: ExpandWhenStuck Algorithm [22] 
 
Algorithms A1 and A3 correspond to percolation graph matching with uni-
form thresholds [44], but match vertices belonging to the same community 
only. Algorithm A4 is the ExpandWhenStuck algorithm proposed in [22]. To 
the best of our knowledge, A4 achieves the best time-accuracy trade-off for 
matching large graphs. Algorithm A2 is the proposed algorithm which uses 
two different thresholds for matching the graphs. We use the naive algorithm 
as A. We eval-uate the algorithm for rc = 1 and rm = 2, which achieves 
excellent results with minimal number of seeds.  
We compare the performance of the algorithms in terms of percolation 
strength and error rate with varying numbers of seeds (Ф) and values of 
sampling parameter (s). For all the experiments, the seeds are chosen 
uniformly at ran-dom. To measure the percolation strength, we compare the 
fraction, f, of vertices matched by the algorithms, i.e., f = 
# 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑
𝑛
. The 
error rate, e, is measured by the fraction of vertices matched incorrectly, i.e., e 
= 
# 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠
# 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑
. 
 
5.1 Description of Datasets 
 
We evaluate the proposed algorithm on synthetic as well as real world 
datasets. For the synthetic networks, the underlying graph, G, is generated 
using the Stochastic Block Model with parameters n = 10000, and b = 2 
(unless stated otherwise). The real world datasets are the collaboration 
networks of authors who submitted papers to Astro Physics (As-Physics) and 
Condensed Matter Physics (CondMat) categories on arXiv [26]. In these 
networks, two authors are connected if they co-authored a paper. We 
consider only the largest connected component in these graphs. The As-
Physics datasets consists of 17903 users and 196972 edges, the average 
degree being 22:01. For the CondMat dataset, these numbers are 21363, 
91286, and 8:55 respectively. We use Louvain community detection algorithm 
implemented in Pajek on the underlying graph to detect the community 
structure [6]. We detect 36 and 55 communities in the As-Physics and 
CondMat datasets, respectively. To generate correlated networks, G1 and G2, 
we sample the edges in the underlying graphs with probability s (values of s 
are described in subsequent subsections). As we aim to demonstrate the 
importance of community labels in graph matching, we assume that the 
attacker knows the community labels of the vertices. 
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Fig. 2: Probability of error versus parameter b for SBM graphs with s = 0.7. 
 
 
5.2 Probability of Error 
 
Although the results derived in this paper hold asymptotically, it is important to 
assess their validity on nite graphs. Let perr denote the probability that the 
proposed percolation algorithm A2 makes an error. To evaluate this 
probability, we generate 200 random instances of the problem and match 
graphs G1 and G2 using the proposed algorithm. Let nerr denote the number of 
instances when the proposed algorithm makes an error. Thus, perr = 
𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑟
200
. 
Figure 2 shows the obtained results as a function of parameter b for two 
values of K and s = 0.7. For small values of b, perr is high and it decreases as 
b increases. For large values of b and K = 10, the algorithm attains perr of 
around 0.08 while for K = 20, perr is almost zero. This shows that side 
information in the form of community labels is extremely helpful in matching 
the graphs. 
 
5.3 Effect of Number of Communities 
 
We first measure the of number of communities on the proposed naive 
(Algorithm 1) and percolation (A2) algorithms. Figure 3 shows the error rate 
achieved by the naive algorithm for SBM graphs with different values of the 
sam-pling parameter. It can be noted that as the number of communities 
increases, the error rate decreases. For larger values of s, even a very small 
number of communities is enough to deanonymize a large percentage of 
users.  
In Figure 4, we depict the performance of algorithm A2 for s = 0.5. For K = 
10, the algorithm requires around 245 seeds to percolate as virtually all the 
correct pairs of vertices get a higher threshold using the naive algorithm in the 
rst step (see Figure 3). However, for K = 20, the number of seeds required to 
percolate decreases drastically to 35 even though the fraction of correct pairs 
assigned a lower threshold is less than 10%. As the number of communities 
increases further, a greater fraction of correct pairs get lower threshold and 
hence percolation is immediate for larger values of K. This shows that the 
performance of our algorithm improves with the number of communities as 
expected. With 
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Fig. 3: Effect of number of communities on the error rate of the naive 
algorithm for SBM graphs with parameters n = 10000, b = 2. 
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Fig. 4: Effect of number of communities on the performance of the proposed 
percolation algorithm for SBM graphs with parameters n = 10000, b = 2, s = 
0.5. 
 
 
only 20 communities, the algorithm achieves less than 0.4% error rate 
although the correlation between the networks is very weak. 
 
5.4 Effect of Seeds 
 
First, we compare the variation in the performance of algorithms A2 and A4 by 
varying the initial seed set S0. We use 100 random seed sets of size 5 to 
obtain the results. Figure 5 shows the comparison of error rate distributions 
for three datasets. It can be seen that our algorithm is insensitive whereas 
algorithm A4 
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Fig. 5: Box plot comparing distributions of error rate for algorithms A2 and A4 
for 100 random seed sets of size 5. X and Y represent algorithms A4 and A2 
respectively. Suffixes 1,2, and 3 represent datasets, 1: SBM (s = 0.8; K = 20), 
2: CondMat (s = 0.7), 3: As-Physics (s = 0.7). Box represents the Inter 
Quartile Range (IQR), horizontal line in the box denotes the median, +, 
denote mean and outliers respectively, horizontal lines above and below the 
box denote maximum and minimum respectively. 
 
 
is highly sensitive to the quality of seeds. As the median is robust to outliers, 
we report the median of error rates over 100 random seed sets for algorithm 
A4 in the experiments.  
Figure 6 shows the deanonymization results for the synthetic networks 
with s = 0:8 and K = 20 for varying number of seeds. Figure 6(a) depicts the 
perco-lation behavior of the algorithms. Algorithm A3 is dropped because it 
required more seeds to percolate than the other three algorithms. It can be 
seen that all three algorithms percolate instantaneously, but the proposed 
algorithm A2 maps almost the complete network. Note that algorithm A4 
achieves the same per-centage of correctly matched vertices with 10 seeds. 
The error rate comparison is shown in Figure 6(b). The proposed algorithm 
outperforms both algorithms A1 and A4 and achieves near zero error rate with 
only 1 seed. It is interesting to note that algorithm A4 is able to perform well 
with around 5 seeds and is worse than A1 for fewer seeds.  
Figure 7 shows the deanonymization results for the As-Physics dataset 
with s = 0.9. The fractions of users in the intersection with degree greater than 
or equal to 1 and 2 are approximately 98% and 90% respectively. The 
community 
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(b) Error Rate vs Number of Seeds 
 
Fig. 6: Deanonymization results for SBM dataset with parameters n = 10000, 
b = 2, s = 0.8, and K = 20. 
 
 
detection algorithm partitions the network into 36 disjoint communities. It can 
be noted that using constant threshold rc = rm = 1, algorithm A1 maps around 
83% of the users but results in very high error rate. Algorithm A3 needs 
around 9 seeds to percolate to 72% of the users. The error rate in this case is 
more than 40%. The proposed algorithm performs much better than the other 
two. It maps more than 82% users with error rate around 24%. Also note that 
our algorithm percolates with only 2 seeds. Although algorithm A4 maps more 
users, our algorithm achieves lower error rate. 
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Fig. 7: Deanonymization results for As-Physics dataset with s = 0.9. 
 
 
Figures 8 shows the deanonymization results for the CondMat dataset, 
which is much sparser than the previous dataset, for s = 0.7. The fractions of 
users with degrees at least 1 and 2 in the intersection graph are around 96% 
and 70% respectively. Algorithm A1 resulted in more than 80% error rate and 
algorithm A3 needed more than 20 seeds to percolate hence the results of 
these algorithms are not shown. The other two algorithms percolate with only 
2 seeds, as can be seen in Figure 8(a), with algorithm A4 mapping slightly 
higher number of users than the proposed algorithm. However, as depicted in 
Figure 8(b), the former algorithm makes more errors than our algorithm. 
Figure 8(b) also shows the Inter 
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Fig. 8: Deanonymization results for CondMat dataset with s = 0.7. 
 
 
Quartile Range (IQR) for algorithm A4. Note that even the 25
th
 percentile is well 
above the error rate achieved by the proposed algorithm, even with 10 seeds. 
 
5.5 Effect of Sampling Parameter 
 
In this subsection, we compare the performance of algorithms by varying the 
levels of correlation. In the rst experiment, we compare the percolation thresh-
old (minimum number of seeds required to percolate) of algorithms A2 and A3 
for the synthetic dataset with K = 10, 20. As seen in Figure 9, the proposed 
algorithm requires far fewer seeds to percolate than the percolation algorithm 
with uniform threshold. In particular, for s = 0.5, assigning a lower threshold 
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to less than 10% correct pairs (see Figure 3) changes the percolation 
threshold from 285 to 35 for K = 20. At higher values of s, algorithm A2 
requires only 1 seed to percolate. Also note that for K = 20, the algorithm 
requires fewer seeds than for K = 10. The reason for this is the fact that when 
K = 20, more correct pairs get a lower threshold for matching. This highlights 
the importance of community labels as side information, especially when 
number of communities is bigger.  
In the next set of experiments, we compare the overall performance of the 
algorithms A1-A4 on synthetic and real datasets. The number of seeds is xed 
at 10 for all the experiments. To measure the performance, we use the F1-
score defined as follows:  
P R 
(15) 
 
F
1 
= 2
 P + R 
 
 
where P = 1 e, R = #correct matches are the precision and recall respectively. 
n
int 
Here nint is the number of vertices in the giant component of the intersection 
graph GՈ. The F1 score combines both the percolation strength and error 
rates achieved by the algorithms into a single index. An F1 score closer to 1 
means better performance of an algorithm in terms of both percolation 
strength and error rate.  
Figure 10 shows the F1 scores for the synthetic dataset with K = 20. Al-
gorithm A3 is not shown as it did not percolate for any value of s. Note that 
our algorithm outperforms algorithm A1 for most values of s; at s = 0.5 our 
algorithm did not percolate. Compared to algorithm A4, our algorithm 
achieves better scores when the datasets are weakly correlated (s ≤ 0.7). 
Even when s = 0.8, our algorithm is slightly better than algorithm A4.  
Figure 11 shows the F1 scores for the As-Physics dataset. As before, for 
low values of s, the proposed algorithm outperforms the other three 
algorithms. Algorithm A1 percolates, but makes many errors and hence 
achieves low scores even at higher values of s. At s = 0.9, the proposed 
algorithm obtains a score which is better by a value of 0.1 than that of 
algorithm A4. Note that the IQR at s = 0.7 for A4 is large, which shows the 
sensitivity of the algorithm to the quality of seeds.  
Figure 12 shows the F1 scores for the CondMat dataset. At high values of 
s, algorithm A4 achieves slightly better scores than the proposed algorithm. 
However, at lower values, the proposed algorithm outperforms other 
algorithms. It is worth noting that algorithm A4 results in almost 100% error 
rate for s 0.6, although it percolates. 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we investigate the importance of side information in the graph 
matching problem. We show that the information about the community struc-
ture can be used to match two correlated SBM graphs perfectly with high 
prob-ability, without using seeds. When the seeds are available, we also show 
that 
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Fig. 9: Percolation threshold for algorithms A2 and A3. 
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Fig. 10: F1-score comparison for different levels of correlation for the synthetic 
dataset. 
 
 
the community structure helps in reducing the matching threshold, in the per-
colation graph matching algorithm, from r = 4 to r = 2. When an attacker has 
access to an imperfect matching, we propose a novel percolation algorithm 
with two thresholds, to match two correlated graphs. We prove the conditions 
under which the algorithm does not make errors whenever it percolates. 
Experimental results suggest that our algorithm performs extremely well on 
the synthetic and real world networks and outperforms other percolation 
algorithms when the cor-relation between the networks is low. We also show 
that our algorithm percolates with only a few seeds, is robust to the quality of 
seeds and works well even when the community labels are known only for a 
fraction of users. 
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Fig. 11: F1-score comparison for different levels of correlation for the As-
Physics dataset. 
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Fig. 12: F1-score comparison for different levels of correlation for the 
CondMat dataset. 
 
 
There are two main practical implications of our work. First, it shows that 
side information in the form of community labels has the capability to assist an 
attacker in network deanonymization, especially in the low correlation regime. 
Second, in situations where the correlation is strong, information about com-
munity labels helps in reducing the number of seeds needed to percolate and 
mitigates the Effect of seed quality on the deanonymization results.  
There are various future directions to explore as a result of our findings. 
For example, it is pertinent to study other types of side information which 
could help an attacker to match correlated networks. Such studies could help 
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in designing mechanisms to mitigate the Effect of such side information in net-
work deanonymization. Studying similar two-threshold percolation algorithms 
for other random graph models like preferential attachment [5], and con gura-
tion models [33], can provide more insights into the problem of matching real 
world graphs. A more realistic modi cation of this problem involves 
considering overlapping communities. We expect our results to motivate 
research in these directions in order to understand the graph matching 
problem more concretely. 
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